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Building upon a previous experimental study, we implement an unstructured, time-
limited, two-person bargaining game with asymmetric information and investigate 
the impact of reputation and expectation effects. The experimental treatments 
vary with respect to spillover-inducing information available to the participants. 
The results suggest that reputation effects decrease conflict, whereas expectation 
effects tend to increase conflict. Moreover, reputation effects diminish the influence 
of social comparisons but can augment the effects of rational learning.
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Introduction
In recent decades, mounting empirical evidence has emerged for patterns of 
influence between negotiations in different bargaining units (e.g. Babcock et al., 
1996, 2005; Kuhn and Gu, 1999; Lehr et al., 2015a) and between past and pre-
sent negotiations within the same bargaining unit (e.g. Campolieti et al., 2005; 
Lehr et al., 2015a, 2015b; Mauro, 1982; McConnell, 1989; Schnell and Gramm, 
1987; cf. Blinder and Choi, 1990; Agell and Lundborg, 1995, 2003; Bewley, 
1999). We refer to patterns of influence between negotiations as “spillovers.” If 
spillovers occur between different bargaining units, we refer to them as “hori-
zontal spillovers.” If spillovers occur between past and present negotiations 
within the same bargaining unit, we refer to them as “vertical spillovers.” This 
article studies the impact of these spillovers on conflict as indicated by the 
divergence between union demands and firm offers in wage bargaining.
Various theoretical mechanisms have been proposed as explanations for 
either type of spillover. These theoretical mechanisms are based on differing 
assumptions and yield strikingly contradictory predictions about the impact 
of spillovers on conflict in wage bargaining. Moreover, the different spillo-
ver mechanisms have predominantly been studied separately without taking 
into account their joint impact and potential interactions. What is lacking is 
(1) a coherent framework within which to study the horizontal and vertical 
spillovers resulting from different mechanisms and (2) adequate knowledge 
of the impact of spillovers resulting from different and possibly simultane-
ously operating mechanisms on conflict. This knowledge gap is aggravated 
by empirical difficulties in adequately identifying spillovers using tradi-
tional econometric data related to the inherently ambiguous choice of 
appropriate reference negotiations to investigate and the high potential for 
spurious correlations (see Heckman, 1991; Manski, 1993; Mitchell, 1982)
In this study, we present a theoretical framework for studying horizontal 
and vertical spillovers, each resulting from different mechanisms. Building 
on a previous study of horizontal spillovers (Lehr et al., 2016) taken in iso-
lation, we then study the impact of vertical spillovers on conflict in an 
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environment that also allows for horizontal spillovers using a bargaining 
experiment. Two causal mechanisms for vertical spillovers are investigated: 
reputation effects and expectation effects. We thus address the following 
research question: how do vertical spillovers resulting from reputation 
effects and expectation effects influence conflict in wage bargaining?
The experimental method allows for complete control over the informa-
tion available to the negotiators and therefore offers three important benefits: 
(1) the choice of investigated reference negotiations becomes unambiguous, 
(2) spurious correlations are prevented, and (3) the ability to manipulate the 
information available to the negotiators enables us to identify different 
mechanisms as causes of spillover.
We implement a two-person (union and firm negotiator) unstructured 
bargaining game with asymmetric information using a 2 × 2 treatment 
design and a control condition. The treatment conditions provide subjects 
with information about the negotiations of others. One treatment condition 
varies whether the firm negotiator in the other negotiation has an unknown 
ability to pay or the other firm negotiator has an identical ability to pay. The 
other treatment varies whether subjects receive information about the firm 
negotiator’s relative earnings in the previous negotiation. We analyze the 
impact of the resulting horizontal and vertical spillovers on the level of 
conflict between the union and firm negotiators as indicated by the diver-
gence between their proposals during the bargaining process.
In general, our findings suggest that reputation effects decrease conflict, 
whereas expectation effects increase conflict. Moreover, interactions exist 
between horizontal and vertical spillovers in their impact on conflict. More 
specifically, the presence of information to the union about the relative earn-
ings of the firm in previous negotiations creates fairness reputations for firms 
that can decrease conflict, whereby firms that accept lower shares face less 
conflict. Such reputations also suppress the escalating impacts that may result 
from horizontal spillovers (caused by social comparisons), but reinforce hori-
zontal spillovers that do not have an escalating impact (caused by rational 
learning). The findings also suggest that unions’ prior earning can create 
expectation effects which lead to increased conflict. Given that previous stud-
ies of spillovers have exclusively analyzed specific mechanisms for spillovers 
in isolation, our findings highlight the importance of understanding the joint 
impact of different mechanisms for vertical and horizontal spillovers.
Theoretical framework
Basic assumptions
We assume that wage bargaining can be modeled as the division of an eco-
nomic surplus (Abowd, 1987), the value of which is known to the firm but 
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not to the union. This information asymmetry entails that only a firm knows 
about its own state, that is, how much is “on the table” in the negotiation. 
There is abundant empirical evidence that this fundamental information 
asymmetry in wage bargaining is one of the chief causes of conflict (Card, 
1990; Cramton and Tracy, 2003; Hayes, 1984; Kennan and Wilson, 1989; 
McConnell, 1989).
Second, we assume that in addition to uncertainty about the state of the 
firm, wage bargaining is characterized by negotiators’ uncertainty about the 
type of their opponent, who may be “greedy” or “fair.” Thus, wage bargain-
ing takes place in a context of “state uncertainty” and “type uncertainty” 
due to private information about these aspects.
Behavioral assumptions
Theoretical mechanisms for spillovers rely on one of two possible assump-
tions. The first assumption would be that negotiators will use information 
that allows them to reduce each of these uncertainties. This entails that spill-
overs can result from a process of uncertainty reduction about private infor-
mation aspects through the use of information about other negotiations. The 
second assumption would be that negotiators’ preferences are reference-
dependent (see Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). Consequently, comparisons 
to reference points affect negotiators’ preferred outcomes. This entails that 
spillovers can result from negotiators’ reference-dependent preferences, 
which are affected by information about other negotiations.
Uncertainty reduction about private information: rational 
learning and reputation effects
The assumption that spillovers take place because negotiators use informa-
tion about other negotiations to reduce uncertainty about private informa-
tion is the basis for two mechanisms: (1) rational learning, which causes 
horizontal spillovers; and (2) reputation effects, which cause vertical spillo-
vers (see Table 1).
Table 1. Four mechanisms of spillover.
Type of 
spillover
Behavioral assumption
Uncertainty reduction 
about private information
Reference-dependent 
preferences
Horizontal Rational learning Social comparisons
Vertical Reputation effects Expectation effects
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Horizontal spillovers due to rational learning occur when the ability of 
different firms to pay wages is positively correlated, such as when these 
firms operate in the same sector and therefore face identical product market 
conditions or technological shocks. When such a correlation is present, 
unions can reduce their uncertainty about the state of the firm they are bar-
gaining with by observing negotiations in similar firms (Burgess, 1988; 
Kuhn and Gu, 1999). Unions then base their demands on the observed set-
tlements (or strikes) in other bargaining units. Note that in this case, unions 
are only affected by information about other bargaining units because this 
allows them to reduce their uncertainty about the firm’s ability to pay; that 
is, the use of this information is strictly rational. This mechanism for hori-
zontal spillovers may consequently be referred to as “rational learning.” 
Because the initial information asymmetry between the union and the firm 
about the firm’s ability to pay is an important cause of conflict, the rational 
learning mechanism leads to the prediction that horizontal spillovers reduce 
the level of conflict in bargaining.
Vertical spillovers due to reputation effects occur when negotiators have 
information about the past behavior of the opposing negotiator. Under the 
assumption that behavioral types are stable, this information allows negotia-
tors to reduce their uncertainty about the behavioral type of the opposing 
negotiator, which is strictly rational in this sense. The effect of information 
about these stable behavioral patterns, or reputations (Abreu and Gul, 2000; 
Kreps and Wilson, 1982; Roth and Schoumaker, 1983), on other negotia-
tors’ bargaining behavior thus constitutes a mechanism for vertical spillo-
vers. Reputation effects become especially important when there exists 
some information asymmetry between actors that interact repeatedly 
(Milgrom and Roberts, 1982). These conditions are clearly present in wage 
bargaining, which occurs at regular intervals for any bargaining unit and in 
which firms know their behavioral type and their ability to pay, whereas 
unions are uncertain about these aspects of the negotiation. Conversely, 
firms are uncertain about the behavioral type of the union; hence, both sides 
of the bargaining table may build reputations. However, it is particularly the 
firm’s reputation that is of interest. The firm’s reputation not only conveys 
information about its behavioral type to the union but indirectly also con-
veys information about the firm’s state, namely, its ability to pay. Thus, 
“type uncertainty” is not independent from “state uncertainty” here. 
Although a firm’s offers may reveal its state to the union, the credibility that 
unions assign to these offers will depend on the type of firm it believes it is 
negotiating with based on the firm’s reputation.
We argue that the reputation mechanism offers a way of reducing the 
level of conflict in bargaining. In principle, firms can abuse their informa-
tional advantage by convincing unions to accept relatively low wages even 
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when the firm’s ability to pay is actually high. However, at some time after 
the wage agreement is signed, the firm’s true ability to pay will be revealed, 
such as through accounting information in financial statements. Unions are 
then able to ascertain the fairness of past wage offers. The firm would con-
sequently enter future negotiations with a reputation for greediness, and the 
union would no longer interpret the firm’s wage offers as an accurate repre-
sentation of its ability to pay. However, when firms make wage offers or 
accept wage demands that represent a fair share of common economic sur-
plus, they create a reputation that credibly signals their fairness to the 
unions. This reputation ensures that the unions will continue to take firms’ 
wage offers in future negotiations as reflections of the firms’ ability to pay 
and mitigate their demands or lowest acceptable offers in response to the 
firms’ bargaining behavior. Especially when economic circumstances 
adversely affect firms’ ability to pay, their reputations may help convince 
unions to accept a low offer or to lower their demands. The unions then 
interpret the firms’ offers as a credible signal of a low ability to pay rather 
than posturing. In the organizational literature, it is particularly well recog-
nized that firms can benefit from investing in positive reputations (Lange 
et al., 2011), including reputations for being good employers (e.g. Turban 
and Cable, 2003). Indeed, a qualitative analysis of wage setting in the 
United States (Bewley, 1999) suggests that reputations that inspire trust in 
management among unions and employees are highly beneficial for firms 
seeking to peacefully restrain wage increases or even cut wages when they 
face economic adversity.
Reference-dependent preferences: social comparisons and 
expectation effects
The assumption that spillovers take place because negotiators’ preferences 
are reference-dependent is also the basis for two mechanisms: (1) social 
comparisons, which cause horizontal spillovers; and (2) expectation effects, 
which cause vertical spillovers (see Table 1).
Horizontal spillovers due to social comparisons occur when individuals 
compare themselves to relevant others (see Festinger, 1954). In the wage 
bargaining context, such comparisons entail that the wage rate in one firm 
influences what workers in another firm consider acceptable wages 
(Babcock et al., 2005; Bewley, 1999; Rees, 1993). Thus, bargaining out-
comes in other firms become reference points (see Kahneman and Tversky, 
1979) for the workers. Because union negotiators represent the interests of 
these workers, the result is that the union negotiators’ preferences in bar-
gaining will be affected by information about bargaining outcomes in other 
firms.
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Firm negotiators are less susceptible to making comparisons due to their 
superior information about their own ability to pay (see also Lehr et al., 2016). 
However, there is no a priori reason to believe that the firm negotiators are 
immune to making comparisons. However, union and firm negotiators are 
likely to take different negotiations as salient reference points. Although the 
union will perceive relatively high wages achieved elsewhere as more attrac-
tive reference points, the firm negotiator will prefer to be guided by relatively 
low wages elsewhere. This “self-serving bias” in the evaluation of reference 
points (Babcock et al., 1995; Babcock and Loewenstein, 1997) will increase 
the divergence between the union negotiators’ preferences and the firm nego-
tiators’ preferences and hence the level of conflict in bargaining.
Vertical spillovers due to expectation effects occur when individuals 
compare their potential future outcomes to their past outcomes. In the wage 
bargaining context, past wage agreements become reference points against 
which workers and negotiators evaluate potential future wages. In this way, 
information about past negotiations and their outcomes leads to expectation 
effects.
As with social comparisons, there is no a priori reason to believe that 
firm negotiators are immune to expectations, but their knowledge of their 
own ability to pay limits the impact of such expectations. As with social 
comparisons, it is also important to recognize that the way negotiators 
evaluate past wages as reference points is guided by bias. The guiding bias 
in this case is loss aversion (Tversky and Kahneman, 1991), or the predis-
position of human beings to avoid outcomes that entail a loss when com-
pared to another situation deemed relevant. The importance of expectation 
effects is highlighted by empirical research. Wages are found to be his-
tory-dependent (Card, 1990); past wages are an important determinant of 
future wages. Extensive qualitative research (Bewley, 1999) indicates that 
workers have strong preferences to retain at least their previous wage 
level under a new contract. Previous wage levels thus become workers’ 
initial minimum acceptable new wage levels, and this is echoed by the 
union negotiators. These expectation effects lead to increasing levels of 
conflict in bargaining when firms are not able to meet expected wages due 
to economic setbacks.
The model
We model wage bargaining as a two-person unstructured bargaining game 
with asymmetric information. The common surplus to be divided has a 
value that is randomly drawn for each negotiation from a uniformly distrib-
uted set of possible values (see Lehr et al., 2016). Firm players know the 
exact value of the common surplus; union players only know the set of 
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possible values and that each value has equal probability of being realized. 
Bargaining starts with a proposal by the union player, analogous to trade 
unions’ initial wage demands in wage bargaining. The bargaining process is 
time-limited, and bargaining time is common knowledge. At any moment 
within the allotted bargaining time, both players are free to wait, make (an 
unrestricted number of) proposals, or accept the other player’s most recent 
proposal. Proposals are bound between zero and the highest potential sur-
plus value, and they represent the union players’ earnings if accepted (i.e. 
the “wage rate”). The firm players’ earnings are defined as the common 
surplus minus the accepted proposal (i.e. the residual profit after the cost of 
labor is deducted). Bargaining ends if a proposal is accepted or if the allot-
ted bargaining time expires. If no proposal is accepted before the deadline, 
the two players earn the non-agreement payoff of zero points. The value of 
the non-agreement payoffs is common knowledge.
The bargaining model captures wage bargaining as an interactive process 
of decision making with a time-increasing risk of suffering the cost of not 
reaching an agreement. This reflects that in wage bargaining, both sides of 
the bargaining table have incentives to aim for the highest possible outcome 
for themselves but evaluate this outcome against the cost of potential con-
flict (such as strikes, lockouts, or the termination of the bargaining unit).
Experimental design
We implement a repeated bargaining game over the division of a common 
surplus that is defined as 24 points plus a number of additional points. The 
number of additional points can be any even number between −12 and 12 
with equal probability and is randomly selected from the set of possible 
values in each period. The common surplus could consequently be as low as 
12 points or as high as 36 points in any given period. The union player only 
knows that the total surplus will be 24 points plus the variable surplus. The 
firm player knows the number of additional points and therefore the actual 
value of the common surplus.
Each pair of players bargains by making proposals that represent the 
number of points that, if accepted, the union player will receive. Negotiations 
start with an opening proposal by the union player, after which both players 
are free to either make any number of proposals in the 0–36 range or accept 
the other player’s most recent proposal. Bargaining time is limited to 60 sec-
onds. During bargaining, the history of proposals can be seen by both play-
ers. When a proposal is accepted, the union player earns the number of 
points represented by that proposal, whereas the firm player earns 24 points 
plus the additional number of points minus the proposal. After each com-
pleted negotiation, the players are privately informed about their own 
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payoffs. There is no communication between the players other than through 
the proposals that they make.
The bargaining game is repeated for 15 periods. One set of 15 values for 
the additional points is randomly drawn before the first experimental ses-
sion and subsequently used for all bargaining units in all sessions. The par-
ticipants are randomly matched to a different opponent in each period.
We implement 2 × 2 experimental treatment conditions and a control 
condition. In the CONTROL condition, which was administered in the first 
session, the bargaining game is executed as described above. In the treat-
ment conditions, which were administered in the subsequent sessions, the 
identical bargaining protocol is implemented but with additional informa-
tion for the players. This additional information is used to induce horizontal 
and vertical spillovers. The complete experimental instructions and bargain-
ing screens are reported in Appendix 1. An overview of the conditions is 
provided in Table 2.
We induce horizontal spillovers that do not allow for rational learning 
in the UNCORRELATED treatment condition. We induce horizontal 
spillovers that allow for both rational learning and social comparisons in 
the CORRELATED treatment condition. In both treatment conditions, we 
provide the two players with information about a negotiation outcome of 
one other pair, which we refer to as the “reference outcome.” Both players 
receive the same reference outcome. This reference outcome informs 
players about the accepted proposal in one other negotiation (i.e. the num-
ber of points earned by the union player) or that there was no agreement if 
there was no proposal accepted in the other negotiation. The participants 
are truthfully informed that the reference outcomes are actually observed 
outcomes under the same bargaining protocol.1 The reference outcome 
appears on the screen below a statement reading “Information about nego-
tiation outcome of one other pair” and is visible throughout the bargaining 
process.
Table 2. Overview of treatments.
Reference outcomes Information about firm players previous share 
earned
No Yes
No CONTROL  
From negotiations with 
identical common surplus
CORRELATED CORRELATED/
REPUTATION
From negotiations with 
unknown common surplus
UNCORRELATED UNCORRELATED/
REPUTATION
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For the UNCORRELATED treatment condition, the reference outcome 
is taken from a negotiation in which the number of additional points was 
unknown to the negotiators receiving the reference outcome. The players 
received a statement below the reference outcome saying, “The number of 
additional points in this other pair was one of the numbers {-12,-10,-8,-6,-
4,-2,0,2,4,6,8,10,12}, all equally likely.” In this treatment condition, the 
players cannot rationally improve their knowledge about the size of the 
common surplus with the aid of the reference outcomes. Horizontal spillo-
vers are consequently assumed to be attributable to social comparisons 
exclusively in this treatment.
For the CORRELATED treatment condition, the reference outcome 
comes from a negotiation with an identical number of additional points. We 
inform the participants about this via a statement above the reference out-
come that says, “The number of additional points in this other pair was 
EXACTLY THE SAME as it is now in your pair.” Because firm states are 
correlated in this treatment and the players are aware of this, the reference 
outcomes can inform about the size of the common surplus and thus enable 
rational learning.
In each treatment session, half of the players are randomly assigned to the 
UNCORRELATED treatment condition and the other half to the CORRELATED 
treatment condition. In both treatments, two randomly selected bargaining pairs 
in each period receive a non-agreement as a reference outcome, indicated by the 
statement, “There was DISAGREEMENT.” The remaining pairs receive infor-
mation about an agreed outcome. To identify the impact of the value of the ref-
erence outcomes within each treatment, we systematically vary this value in 
both treatments by selecting the highest appropriate observed reference out-
come for half of the pairs and the lowest appropriate observed reference out-
come for the other half of the pairs.
Vertical spillover. Establishing the precise impact of expectations and reputa-
tions necessitates careful isolation of the impact of these mechanisms from 
confounding factors that would arise from repeated interactions between the 
same subjects, such as emotional dynamics. We therefore implement a ran-
dom re-matching procedure after each period. In this way, the anonymously 
interacting subjects repeat the same bargaining game in every period but do 
not have a history with their opposing subject. This design departs from the 
stable bargaining units common in real-wage bargaining but offers a supe-
rior means to analyze the impact of information about previous bargaining 
periods on the behavior of individual subjects.
To incorporate the reputation mechanism, we provide the players with 
information about the firm player’s past behavior, specifically the percent-
age share of the common surplus the firm player earned in the previous 
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period. If no proposal was accepted in the firm player’s previous negotia-
tion, the information showed that there was disagreement. This information 
was provided in an otherwise identical replication of the UNCORRELATED 
and CORRELATED treatment conditions, yielding the UNCORRELATED/
REPUTATION and CORRELATED/REPUTATION treatment conditions.
Expectation effects may occur in all five experimental conditions. This is 
because all union players bargain repeatedly (15 times in total), and thus the 
outcome of each negotiation may become a reference point against which 
subsequent outcomes are compared. It must be noted that the value of the 
additional number of points, and thus the value of the common surplus, is 
independently and randomly chosen for each period. Consequently, the 
union players cannot rationally improve their knowledge of the value of the 
common surplus with information about their outcomes in previous periods. 
If past outcomes have an influence on subsequent bargaining behavior, this 
would be attributed to the reference-dependent preferences of the players.2
Summary of previous findings
This study builds upon the Lehr et al. (2016) study on the impact of horizontal 
spillovers on conflict that used data from the CONTROL, UNCORRELATED, 
and CORRELATED treatment conditions. We first summarize the findings of 
that study and then discuss the hypotheses about vertical spillovers we test 
with the current, more elaborate set-up.
In the previous study, we found that conflict is increased by horizontal 
spillovers resulting from social comparisons in the UNCORRELATED 
treatment condition compared to the CONTROL condition. In this condi-
tion, the more the reference outcomes deviate in either direction from the 
initial focal point (see Schelling, 1960) of 12 points,3 the more union play-
ers raise their demands in this condition. This pattern reflects the impact of 
self-serving biases: union players take advantage of increasingly favorable 
reference outcomes, and try to prevent increasingly unfavorable reference 
outcomes from gaining salience in the negotiation by increasing their 
demands. This leads to a V-shaped relationship between reference outcomes 
and union proposals. Because firm players do not respond to the reference 
outcomes regardless of their value, this leads to increased divergence.
Furthermore, we found that conflict is lower in the CORRELATED 
treatment condition than in the UNCORRELATED treatment condition but 
not the CONTROL condition. In the UNCORRELATED treatment condi-
tion, horizontal spillover through the rational learning mechanisms is pos-
sible. This results in a linear relationship between reference outcomes and 
union demands, which now increase when the common surplus increases. 
However, the findings also suggested that, rather than decreasing conflict in 
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its own right, making rational learning possible appears to prevent the con-
flicts that arise from horizontal spillovers driven by social comparisons and 
affected by self-serving biases.
Hypotheses
A particularly robust finding in the experimental literature analyzing structured 
games such as the ultimatum game is that subjects tend to deviate from the 
subgame-perfect equilibrium strategy (i.e. offer/accept the smallest possible 
amount) by settling on approximations of the equal split of the common surplus 
value (see Camerer and Thaler, 1995; Güth and Kocher, 2014; Güth and Tietz, 
1990; Thaler, 1988). We assume that the tendency toward the equal split will 
also feature in our unstructured bargaining game. This tendency may be less 
prevalent when there is private information about the pie size (e.g. Croson, 
1996; Rapoport et al., 1996; Straub and Murnighan, 1995), as is the case in our 
experiment. In contrast, the equal split tendency is reinforced when subjects’ 
fairness is visible to others because fairness is socially desirable (see Andreoni 
and Bernheim, 2009; Hoffman et al., 1994). Visible “fairness” is clearly a fea-
ture in our experiment under conditions in which firm players’ relative earnings 
in the previous period are known to the union player, namely, in the 
UNCORRELATED/REPUTATION and CORRELATED/REPUTATION 
treatment conditions. As we will show in the analyses of the data, the assump-
tion that outcomes will tend to be equal splits of the pie is in fact strongly justi-
fied for all treatments by the observations in our experiment.
Reputation effects. The introduction of reputations by providing information 
about the firm players’ relative earnings in the previous period affects the 
level of conflict in bargaining. The assumption that accepted proposals will 
approximate the equal split implies that firm players’ visible reputations 
tend to show that they have agreed to proposals that reflect approximately 
half of the common surplus. In this way, they are signaling that they are fair 
and do not use their information about the common surplus to gain dispro-
portionately large shares. This information allows the union players to 
reduce their uncertainty about the type of firm player they are bargaining 
with provided that they interpret the firm players’ fairness as stable over 
time. Firm players that are known to have been fair previously would be 
expected to be fair in the current negation and less likely to “hide” behind 
proposals that are far below the equal split of the current surplus. Union 
players are then more likely to consider the firm player’s offers to reflect the 
true state of the firm and more readily lower their proposals during the bar-
gaining process. This reduces the divergence between the union and firm 
players’ proposals.
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Further reasons to expect a reduction of conflict are related to the pres-
ence of horizontal spillovers. In the UNCORRELATED treatment condi-
tion, such horizontal spillovers are driven by social comparisons and 
increase conflict. The introduction of firm players’ reputations in the 
UNCORRELATED/REPUTATION treatment condition has two conse-
quences. First, the relative salience of the reference outcomes that do not 
allow for any reduction of uncertainty is diminished by the availability of 
additional information in the form of reputation, which allows union players 
to reduce uncertainty about the type of firm player. Second, union players 
that believe that the opposing firm negotiator is fair are less likely to believe 
that firm players would abuse the presence of unfavorable (low) reference 
outcomes. Consequently, the union players are less likely to respond to such 
reference outcomes by raising their initial demands, which is a major source 
of increased divergence in the UNCORRELATED treatment condition. 
Hence, we expect that the introduction of information about firm players’ 
share earned in the previous period reduces conflict when reference out-
comes are uncorrelated to the value of the common surplus:
Hypothesis 1. Divergence is lower in negotiations in the UNCORRELATED/
REPUTATION treatment condition than in negotiations in the UNCORRE-
LATED treatment condition.
In the CORRELATED treatment condition, horizontal spillovers can 
also result from rational learning and, as a result, do not increase conflict. 
Rational learning takes place because the value of the common surplus in 
the negotiation yielding the reference outcome is identical to the value of 
the common surplus in the players’ own negotiation. Union players may 
interpret the reference outcomes as equal splits of the common surplus, thus 
learning its value. Lower reference outcome values imply a lower value of 
the common surplus and should therefore lead to lower proposals by union 
players. However, unions cannot ascertain whether the reference outcome 
really reflects an equal split of the common surplus or whether the other 
union actually earned less than the equal split. Hence, some uncertainty 
about the value of the common surplus persists. Union players that lower 
their demands in response to low reference outcomes risk earning less than 
their “fair share” if the firm is willing to “hide behind” reference outcomes 
that are less than the equal split. When firm reputations are known, the 
union players are better informed about the firms’ willingness to be fair. 
Thus, whereas we expect horizontal spillovers due to social comparisons to 
diminish when firm players’ reputations are introduced, we expect horizon-
tal spillovers due to rational learning to be augmented when firm players’ 
reputations are introduced. Therefore, union players’ proposals will be more 
16 Rationality and Society 30(1)
closely conditioned on the reference outcome value in the CORRELATED/
REPUTATION treatment condition than in the CORRELATED treatment 
condition, resulting in less divergence of proposals. Hence, we expect that 
the introduction of information about firm players’ share earned in the pre-
vious period reduces conflict when reference outcomes are correlated to the 
value of the common surplus:
Hypothesis 2. Divergence is lower in negotiations in the CORRELATED/
REPUTATION treatment condition than in negotiations in the CORRELATED 
treatment condition.
So far, we have assumed that firms’ reputations tend to show that they 
have made or accepted proposals that approximate half of the common sur-
plus in the previous period. However, there will be some variance associ-
ated with the accepted shares. Thus, the level of “fairness” of the firm 
players will vary. The higher the share, the greedier the firm players’ reputa-
tion in the next period is. Conversely, the lower the share, the more fair or 
benevolent4 the firm players’ reputation in the next period is. We propose 
that firm players that are known to have agreed to higher shares of the com-
mon surplus for the union player previously will face less resistance in the 
form of high union proposals in the following period. Union players that 
believe that the firm is willing to offer them relatively large shares are 
expected to lower their own initial proposals and be more responsive to the 
initial (low) proposals of the firm. This decreases the divergence between 
the union players’ and firm players’ proposals. Hence, we expect that when 
the firm player’s share earned in the previous period is known to the union 
player, lower values for this share indicate fairer firms and, all else equal, 
are consequently associated with less conflict:
Hypothesis 3. In the CORRELATED/REPUTATION treatment condi-
tion and the UNCORRELATED/REPUTATION treatment condition, the 
lower the share earned by the firm player in the previous period is, the 
lower divergence is.
Expectation effects. In all experimental conditions, the players bargain for 
15 consecutive periods and know their earning in previous periods. Under 
the assumption that the players are loss averse, expectations effects will 
occur even though the value of the common surplus varies randomly in each 
period. In this case, earnings in one period will become reference points in 
the next period. These expectation effects are particularly significant for 
union players, who, unlike firm players, cannot readjust their preferences to 
match the value of the common surplus in the current period because they 
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do not know its value. Thus, we expect that higher earnings in one period 
will cause union players to make higher proposals in the next period and 
increase their minimum acceptable proposal. Hence, all else equal, we 
expect that the divergence between the union players’ and firm players’ pro-
posals increases and that achieving convergence of the proposals will be 
more difficult, resulting in more conflict in bargaining:
Hypothesis 4. The higher the number of points earned by a union player, 
the more divergence he or she will experience during the following 
period.
Procedures
Our data collection took place in October 2012 in the Nijmegen School of 
Management (NSM) Decision Lab at the Radboud University Nijmegen, 
The Netherlands. We made use of z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) to program the 
experiment. In this study, 148 students participated in one of six experimen-
tal sessions. Each session consisted of 15 periods of interaction5 and lasted 
approximately 1.5 hours, excluding the time needed to pay the participants.
All participants were randomly assigned to a cubicle when they entered 
the laboratory. The computer cubicles were associated with either the role of 
a firm (referred to as PLAYER A) or union player (referred to as PLAYER 
B) in the context-free experiment. In the treatment sessions, each 
computer cubicle was associated with either the UNCORRELATED 
(UNCORRELATED/REPUTATION) or CORRELATED (CORRELATED/
REPUTATION) treatments.
All participants received written instructions for the experiment, which 
were read aloud by one of the experimenters at the beginning of the session. 
Following this, the participants were given the opportunity to ask questions 
for clarification. These questions were answered privately by the experi-
menters. After all questions were answered, the participants were asked to 
complete a questionnaire to ensure that all participants fully understood the 
rules and payoff structure of the bargaining game. These test questions were 
answered by all participants without difficulty. Prior to the 15 periods of 
interaction, two unpaid trial periods were used to ensure that all participants 
were fully acquainted with the procedure.
The participants were paid their earnings in cash immediately follow-
ing the experiment. For each point earned by the participants during the 
experiment, they were paid 6 Euro cents. Average earnings in all experi-
mental sessions combined, including the €3 show-up fee and payment for 
a short pen-and-paper experiment unrelated to the present study, were 
€14.00 (σ = 1.66).
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Experimental evidence
We first analyze whether the assumption that accepted proposals will 
approximate the equal split of the common surplus is justified. Second, we 
present a graphic representation of the development of union and firm pro-
posals during the allocated bargaining time to illustrate the nature of the 
bargaining process in the different treatments. We then proceed to test our 
hypotheses about conflict in bargaining. The unstructured bargaining design 
offers the important benefit of allowing the subjects to arrive at a bargaining 
outcome via a truly interactive decision-making process. This design more 
adequately reflects real-world bargaining situations than ultimatum bar-
gaining, which is ubiquitous in experimental research. Importantly, the 
unstructured bargaining design reveals how the impact of spillovers on ini-
tial conflict is transformed by the process of interactive bargaining. This 
also entails that levels of conflict in the unstructured bargaining environ-
ment cannot simply be inferred from observed non-agreements (which 
would be referred to as “rejections” in the ultimatum game). Rather, the 
analysis of conflict in unstructured bargaining must take into account that 
the level of conflict will differ at different points in time during the 60-sec-
ond bargaining process. The methods and specific estimated models are 
chosen in such a way that this process is accounted for.
Testing the equal split assumption. Table 3 provides descriptive statistics on 
the share of the common surplus represented by the accepted proposals for 
each experimental condition as well as for the pooled observations. These 
statistics strongly support the assumption that accepted shares approximate 
Table 3. Accepted shares of the common surplus.
Mean Mode  
(% of cases)
Median Standard 
deviation
Interquartile 
range
All treatments 0.4873 0.5000 
(18.01)
0.4677 0.1682 0.1611
CONTROL 0.4973 0.5000 
(16.81)
0.4688 0.2185 0.1566
UNCORRELATED 0.4972 0.5000 
(19.12)
0.5000 0.1658 0.1604
CORRELATED 0.5067 0.5000 
(14.29)
0.5000 0.1619 0.1944
UNCORRELATED/
REPUTATION
0.4645 0.5000 
(18.30)
0.4472 0.1469 0.1213
CORRELATED/
REPUTATION
0.4859 0.5000 
(20.08)
0.5333 0.1640 0.1444
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the equal split of the common surplus. We find that the modal accepted 
share is exactly 0.50 (50%) throughout. The mean and median shares also 
clearly show the equal split as the center of the distribution of accepted 
shares. Pooling all treatments, the interquartile range amounts to 16%, with 
similar distributions found in the five experimental conditions separately.
A related issue is our expectation that union players will assume that firm 
player types are stable, such that information about the share agreed to in 
the previous period by the firm player (i.e. its reputation) offers information 
about the firm player’s current willingness to settle on fair outcomes. To 
assess to what extent this assumption is justified, we graph the evolution of 
shares represented by the accepted proposals for each firm player in over 
the 14 periods under analysis for the UNCORRELATED/REPUTATION 
and CORRELATED/REPUTATION treatment conditions in Figure 1. 
Although most firm players show some variation6 in the accepted share 
from period to period, there are few cases of truly erratic behavior. By and 
large, the accepted shares hover around the equal split throughout, suggest-
ing that union players would be justified in assuming reasonably stable firm 
types.
The bargaining process. Figure 2 illustrates how union and firm proposals 
change at the aggregate during the 60-second bargaining process in the five 
experimental conditions. Loess regression lines summarize the observed 
proposals, differentiating between union proposals (the downward-sloping 
lines) and firm proposals (the upward-sloping lines). To offer a fixed refer-
ence, both panels include these lines as observed in the CONTROL condi-
tion. The left-hand panel adds a depiction of the UNCORRELATED and 
UNCORRELATED/REPUTATION treatment conditions, whereas the 
right-hand panel adds a depiction of the CORRELATED and CORRE-
LATED/REPUTATION treatment conditions.
The process of convergence during the 60-second bargaining time is 
clearly visible in all conditions. Union proposals start high and are gradu-
ally revised downward over time. Firm proposals start low (just over zero 
points) and gradually increase as the deadline draws closer. Toward the end 
of the bargaining time, proposals approximately converge toward a five-
point range centered at approximately 12 points, the equal split of the aver-
age expected common surplus value of 24 points.
Comparing the two panels, divergence between the players’ proposals 
increases as a result of inflated union proposals with the introduction of hori-
zontal spillovers due to social comparisons (UNCORRELATED treatment 
condition) but not from horizontal spillovers that also allow for learning 
(CORRELATED treatment condition) (see Lehr et al., 2016). The introduc-
tion of reputation initially appears to have little impact when learning is 
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possible, as evidenced by the similarity of the CORRELATED and 
CORRELATED/REPUTATION treatment conditions. However, a compari-
son of the UNCORRELATED and UNCORRELATED/REPUTATION treat-
ment conditions suggests that divergence decreases substantially when 
reputations are introduced into an environment where horizontal spillovers 
arise purely from social comparisons.
Multivariate analyses. Our analysis, therefore, centers on the level of diver-
gence between the union and firm players’ proposals during different stages 
of the bargaining process. Divergence is measured by subtracting the cur-
rent firm proposal from the current union proposal for every proposal made 
in a negotiation by either player. The resulting value is the difference 
between union demands and firm offers for every given proposal, where 
each proposal may have been made at any time during the bargaining pro-
cess. The observed divergences are subsequently analyzed in a multivariate 
model. To account for the timing of the divergences within each negotiation, 
we include a linear time effect on the right-hand side of the equation. The 
coefficient of this effect can be interpreted as the estimated rate of conver-
gence expressed as a point decrease in divergence per second.
Two problems must be addressed. First, because there are multiple obser-
vations of divergences within each negotiation (12.66 on average), they are 
not independent. Moreover, the negotiations themselves are not independent. 
Due to the observation of the same randomly re-matched subjects over 
Figure 2. Union and firm player proposals over time, loess regression lines.
Downward-sloping lines represent union player proposals; upward-sloping lines represent 
firm player proposals.
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multiple periods, the negotiations are cross-classified within combinations of 
different union and firm players. To account for these dependencies, negotia-
tion and crossed subject-specific random effects are estimated. Furthermore, 
we control for the period of interaction by including a linear period effect. 
Because the value of the common surplus randomly varies from period to 
period, we also control for this value by including a linear effect for the num-
ber of additional points in the negotiation. We estimate two models (full 
results are shown in Appendix 2, Table 4). Model 1 estimates conditional 
average differences in divergence between the five conditions by adding a 
dummy variable for each treatment condition. Model 2 makes these dum-
mies to interact with the bargaining time effect. This allows us to establish 
the rate of convergence in each experimental condition.
Under Hypothesis 1, we expect that divergence will be lower in the 
UNCORRELATED/REPUTATION treatment condition than in the 
UNCORRELATED treatment condition. This hypothesis is strongly supported 
by our findings. The predicted average divergence at the beginning of a nego-
tiation is much lower in the UNCORRELATED/REPUTATION treatment 
condition than in the UNCORRELATED treatment condition. Divergence was 
also hypothesized to be lower in the CORRELATED/REPUTATION treat-
ment condition than in the CORRELATED treatment condition (Hypothesis 
2). We find that divergence is identical in these two conditions, offering no 
support for this hypothesis. Model 2 shows that although divergence is initially 
Figure 3. Marginal effects of bargaining time on divergence (rate of convergence 
per second) in five experimental conditions (95% CI).
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high in the UNCORRELATED treatment condition, the rate of convergence, 
represented by the marginal effect of bargaining time on divergence, is also 
much steeper in this treatment. This is illustrated in Figure 3 by the larger nega-
tive coefficient for bargaining time in the UNCORRELATED treatment condi-
tion. Thus, although there is more conflict at the beginning of the negotiations 
due to social comparisons in the UNCORRELATED experimental condition, 
which does not allow for visible firm reputations, the bargaining process 
“washes out” the difference between this condition and the UNCORRELATED/
REPUTATION treatment condition.
Next, we estimate the impact of the specific horizontal and vertical spillo-
vers on divergence during the bargaining process. All treatment conditions 
feature horizontal spillovers in the form of reference outcomes. The effect of 
the value of these references outcomes is linearly modeled for the 
CORRELATED, CORRELATED/REPUTATION, and UNCORRELATED/
REPUTATION treatment conditions. In line with our previous findings (Lehr 
et al., 2016), the effect is allowed to vary depending on its position relative to 
the initial focal point 12 in the UNCORRELATED treatment condition. This 
non-linearity initially manifests in the union players’ opening proposals as a 
V-shaped relationship between the reference outcome value and the value of 
the opening proposal with a kink at 12 points, and carries over to the diver-
gence during the bargaining process. A dummy signifying that reference out-
comes are non-agreements is included in all models. To account for the 
dynamics of spillovers with the bargaining process itself, each model makes 
the modeled spillover effects to interact with bargaining time.
For each experimental condition, we estimate the effect of the union 
player’s earnings in the previous round (i.e. the “expectations-effect”) and 
the firm’s share of the common surplus earned in the previous period (i.e. 
the “reputations-effect”). A dummy variable controls for non-agreements in 
both cases. The effect of the share of the common surplus earned by the firm 
player in the previous period is estimated in all conditions to prevent the 
attribution of potentially spurious effects to the impact of reputation. For 
ease of interpretation, the evolution of the marginal effects of all spillovers 
during the bargaining process is graphically represented in Figures 4 to 6 
(full results are shown in Appendix 2, Table 5).
Hypothesis 3 predicts that in the UNCORRELATED/REPUTATION 
treatment condition and the CORRELATED/REPUTATION treatment con-
dition, the lower the share earned by the firm player in the previous period, 
the lower the divergence will be. The results, illustrated in Figure 4, support 
this hypothesis, but only for the UNCORRELATED/REPUTATION treat-
ment condition. Strikingly, the impact of reputation in this treatment only 
manifests in the second half of the bargaining process, with increasingly 
greedy firms facing increasingly high levels of divergence.
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Figure 4. Average marginal effects of the share earned by the firm player in the 
previous period on divergence during the bargaining process (95% CI).
Figure 5. Average marginal effects of the points earned by the union player in 
the previous period on divergence during the bargaining process (95% CI).
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We hypothesized that high union expectations would increase conflict, 
resulting in an increase in divergence with higher union player earnings in 
the previous period (Hypothesis 4). Our analyses, illustrated in Figure 5, 
suggest that absent any other spillovers in the CONTROL condition, this is 
indeed the case. However, the initial increase in divergence is transformed 
by the bargaining process, even to the point of the effect changing signs as 
the deadline approaches. The introduction of horizontal spillovers in the 
UNCORRELATED and CORRELATED treatment conditions prevents any 
impact of union expectations on divergence. However, when firm reputa-
tions are also present, the effect re-emerges. Especially in the CORRELATED/
REPUTATION treatment condition, high union expectations have a lasting 
escalating impact on the bargaining process.
Our reasoning for the existence of conflict-decreasing effects of reputations 
is partly based on the expectation that reputations alter the impact of horizontal 
spillovers. Specifically, we argue that social comparisons diminish and are less 
likely to lead to escalating union player demands when the reference outcome 
is unfavorable, whereas rational learning is augmented. We find support for 
both of these arguments. The impact of horizontal spillovers on divergence 
changes with the introduction of firm reputations, as seen in Figure 6. Comparing 
the UNCORRELATED treatment condition with the UNCORRELATED/
REPUTATION treatment condition, we find that the escalating effects of refer-
ence outcomes that are increasingly unfavorable to the union (≤12 points) are 
indeed prevented in the UNCORRELATED/REPUTATION treatment condi-
tion. Moreover, although the effect of horizontal spillovers is very similar in the 
CORRELATED and CORRELATED/REPUTATION treatment conditions in 
terms of effect size, this effect is much less diminished during the bargaining 
process in the CORRELATED/REPUTATION treatment condition.
Conclusion
In this study, we investigated the impact of spillovers on conflict in bargaining. 
Our analysis offers two general insights. First, spillovers that allow for a reduc-
tion of uncertainty about private information tend to decrease conflict in bar-
gaining, whereas spillovers that result from reference-dependent preferences 
tend to increase conflict in bargaining. Second, different sources and different 
mechanisms of spillovers can interact and may strengthen or weaken each other.
The findings suggest that allowing firms to build reputations by offer-
ing unions information about the fairness of firms’ past bargaining behav-
iors decreases conflict in bargaining when horizontal spillovers arise 
exclusively from social comparisons. Two complementary processes 
explain this finding. First, “good reputations,” evidenced by firms offer-
ing or agreeing to larger shares for unions in the past, help to reduce 
Lehr et al. 27
conflict in current negotiations, whereas more “greedy” firms face more 
conflict. Second, when firm reputations are known, the impact of horizon-
tal spillovers resulting from social comparisons is altered. Without knowl-
edge about a firm’s past, unions anticipate the firm’s potentially 
self-serving use of reference outcomes and respond to unfavorable refer-
ence outcomes with escalating demands (Lehr et al., 2016). Knowing that 
the firm is fair based on its reputation prevents such escalation. We find 
that knowledge about the fairness of firms’ past bargaining behavior does 
not decrease conflict in bargaining where horizontal spillovers can be 
caused by rational learning. However, the evidence suggests that firms’ 
reputation may augment the impact of rational learning by decreasing the 
risk of concession making for the union players. Furthermore, we find that 
the unions’ expectations based on their previous bargaining outcomes 
under some conditions affect bargaining, with high expectations leading 
to more conflict. Somewhat surprisingly, these expectation effects are par-
ticularly pronounced when the firms’ past behavior (i.e. their reputations) 
is known. A potential explanation for this finding is that horizontal spillo-
vers by themselves shift the union’s focus to the present, whereas infor-
mation about the firm’s reputation, and therefore its past, makes the 
union’s own past a salient reference point again.
Our study has practical implications for wage bargaining and distributive 
bargaining under asymmetric information in general. Our study suggests 
that the past plays a specific role in bargaining conflicts. Managing reputa-
tions and expectations can have direct influences but also affect how bar-
gaining units respond to information about what occurs in other bargaining 
units. This implies, for instance, that changes in the composition of bargain-
ing units (e.g. bargaining with a different trade union/employer) may dis-
rupt the impact of both vertical and horizontal spillovers. Such compositional 
changes may decrease not only the escalating impacts of expectation effects 
but also the de-escalating impacts of (the informed party’s) reputations. 
Compositional changes can also shift the salient mechanism for horizontal 
spillovers from rational learning to conflict-increasing social comparisons.
Our study also provides a potential behavioral basis for scientific argu-
ments suggesting the benefits of positive reputations of employers (e.g. 
Bewley, 1999; Turban and Cable, 2003) and the potential risks of trade 
union expectations (e.g. Bewley, 1999). More in general, our study sug-
gests that current studies of wage conflicts and experimental bargaining 
that analyze horizontal and vertical spillovers in isolation may produce 
misleading results—neglecting interactions between the mechanisms. 
Future research should address these interactions more explicitly, for 
example, by including them in the specification of econometric models 
for strike data.
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Notes
1. The reference outcomes were in fact selected from the observed outcomes in 
the CONTROL treatment.
2. A slightly different behavioral interpretation of such influences would be the 
reverse gambler’s fallacy, that is, union players may not acknowledge the 
independence of the common surplus values across periods. Hence, they use 
previous outcomes as predictions for current surplus values (e.g. expecting a 
“winning streak” based on previous favorable outcomes). See also Note 6.
3. Twelve points is the initial focal point in our bargaining game because it represents 
exactly the equal split of the expected value of the common surplus (24 points) 
and because it represents the highest proposal that, if accepted, would never result 
in losses for the firm player. As a consequence, reference outcomes that are larger 
than 12 points can be considered favorable to the union player, while reference 
outcomes that are smaller than 12 points can be considered unfavorable.
4. Assuming that approximately even splits of the surplus are considered the fairest 
outcomes, shares that are higher than the even split indicate greediness (the firm 
player, who knows the surplus value did not make or accepted a proposals that 
represents an even split), while shares that are lower than the even split could be 
interpreted as benevolence (firm players that are willing to give more than half 
of the surplus to the union player) or weakness (firm players agreed to proposals 
that exceeded half of the surplus for fear of not reaching an agreement other-
wise). Union players cannot distinguish between benevolence and weakness.
5. In the first session which served as the CONTROL treatment, the variable 
surplus did not take the correct value in the final period of interaction due 
to a software glitch. This would eradicate the perfect correlation between pie 
sizes of the negotiation and the reference outcome in the CORRELATED 
(REPUTATION) treatments. We therefore decided to exclude the final period 
from our analyses. For the two treatments that allow for reputations, this choice 
also precludes “endgame effects” in the analyzed data.
6. A potential driver of this variation would be the gamblers fallacy, that is, firm 
players earning large (small) shares in one period may be expecting to earn 
small (large) shares in the next. However, since firm players do not unilaterally 
decide on the outcome, the variation may also simply reflect the variation in 
opposing union players and in the bargaining process.
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Appendix 1
Instructions CONTROL condition
Experiment instructions
Introduction
You will now participate in an experiment on economic decision making. 
The experiment will last approximately 1.5 hours.
In the experiment, you will collect points. At the end of the experiment, you 
will be paid for all the points you have earned. For your participation, you will 
receive €3. In addition, you can earn points during the experiment. How much 
you will earn crucially depends on the points you earn by your decisions in the 
experiment. No other experiment participant will learn how much you earned
The exchange rate is : ,100 6 1 6points Euro point Euro-cent= =
You are not allowed to talk to other participants or use any electronic com-
munication device, such as your cell phone, from now on. Disobeying this 
rule will result in your exclusion from the experiment and loss of any points 
you have earned.
Description box
In this experiment, you will participate in 15 rounds of interaction.
At the start of the experiment, you will be assigned a role. You can 
become either a PLAYER A or a PLAYER B. You will stay in the 
same role for all 15 rounds of the interaction and will interact with a 
different participant in the other role in each round.
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In each round, you and the other participant will have to agree on how 
to divide a certain number of points. This number will be 24 points 
plus an additional number of points. The number of additional points 
can be different in each round and can be any even number between 
−12 and +12. That means that the additional points can be any of the 
following numbers: {−12, −10, −8, −6, −4, −2, 0, 2, 4, 6, 8, 10, 12}. 
Only PLAYER A will learn the number of additional points in 
each round.
IMPORTANT: Note that the additional points can be a negative 
number, so that the total number of points at the start of each round 
can be as low as 24 − 12 = 12 points, but also as high as 24 + 12 = 36 
points!
At the start of each round, PLAYER A learns the number of additional 
points. After this, PLAYER B can propose any number between 0 and 
36 as the PROPOSAL. The PROPOSAL is the number of points that 
PLAYER B proposes to earn at the end of the round, so that PLAYER 
A will earn the rest of the points. After PLAYER B’s initial 
PROPOSAL, PLAYER A and PLAYER B will have 1 minute to reach 
an agreement on the PROPOSAL.
During this period of 1 minute, both PLAYER A and PLAYER B can pro-
pose any number between 0 and 36 as the PROPOSAL, and change the 
PROPOSAL at any time within the 1 minute. PLAYER A and PLAYER B 
both can at any moment ACCEPT the most recent PROPOSAL made by 
the other person. Thus, an agreement is reached if
either PLAYER A accepts some PROPOSAL made by PLAYER B
or PLAYER B accepts some PROPOSAL made by PLAYER A.
As soon as a PROPOSAL is ACCEPTED, the round of interaction is 
finished and the earnings for that round will be as follows:
PLAYER A’s earnings = [24 points plus the additional points] minus 
the number of points agreed on for the PROPOSAL
PLAYER B’s earnings = the number of points agreed on for the 
PROPOSAL
IMPORTANT: If no PROPOSAL is ACCEPTED within the 1 min-
ute, PLAYER A and PLAYER B will both earn 0 points in that round.
After all participants in the room have finished their interactions, you 
will learn how many points you have earned in this round. Then, the 
next round will start.
Let us now explain what the computer screens look like.
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Screen 1 Player A. You will only see this screen if your role is PLAYER 
A. At the top of this screen, you will learn about the additional number of points 
in this round. After you have learned the additional number of points, press OK 
to continue. The information presented in the top part of screen will also be 
available to you on the next screen.
Screen 1 Player B. You will only see this screen if your role is PLAYER B. At 
the top of this screen, you will see some information about the number of points in this 
round. This information will also be available to you on the next screen. In the lower 
center part of this screen, you can make your initial OPENING PROPOSAL. Type in 
a number between 0 and 36 and press OK to send your OPENING PROPOSAL to 
the other person. After that, you will be taken to the next screen where you will have 
1 minute to reach an agreement on the PROPOSAL with the other person.
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Screen 2 Player A (Negotiation Screen). 
Screen 2 Player B (Negotiation Screen). 
Negotiation screens
In this screen, PLAYER A and PLAYER B will be able to make a PROPOSAL 
or accept the most recent PROPOSAL by the other person within the period 
of 1 minute. The screen is divided into different parts.
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At the top of the screen, the same information as in SCREEN 1 about the 
number of points in the current round is shown.
In the LOWER LEFT part, you will be able to make a PROPOSAL. Type 
in any number between 0 and 36 and press OK. Your PROPOSAL will 
appear on the screen of the person you are matched to.
The LOWER RIGHT part is divided into two sections. To the left, you 
can observe the PROPOSALS made by the other person. Important: If you 
would like to accept the most recent PROPOSAL of the other person, first 
select the PROPOSAL by clicking on it, then click on I ACCEPT THIS 
PROPOSAL. To the right, you can see the PROPOSALS you have send to 
the other person.
As soon as you or the other person accepts a PROPOSAL, this 
PROPOSAL will determine your earnings in this round. If no PROPOSAL 
was accepted within 1 minute, you will earn 0 points.
The experiment now starts with a short test to make sure that everybody 
understands how points are earned. After all experiment participants 
answered all questions correctly, we will first start two trial rounds of inter-
action to insure that everybody understands the how the screens work. 
These two rounds will not add to your earnings. After the trial rounds, the 
15 rounds of interaction that determine your earnings will start.
Please start by answering the following questions.
Test questions
Please write down your answers!
1. Suppose that the additional number of points is −6 and the 
PROPOSAL that PLAYER A and PLAYER B agree on is 10.
○○ How many points did PLAYER A earn?
○○ How many points did PLAYER B earn?
2. Suppose that the additional number of points +6 and the PROPOSAL 
that PLAYER A and PLAYER B agree on is 10.
○○ How many points did the PLAYER A earn?
○○ How many points did the PLAYER B earn?
3. Suppose that the additional number of points is 0; and the 
PROPOSAL that PLAYER A and PLAYER B agree on is 30.
○○ How many points did the PLAYER A earn?
○○ How many points did the PLAYER B earn?
4. Suppose that the both PLAYER A and PLAYER B did not accept 
any PROPOSAL within 1 minute.
○○ How many points did the PLAYER A earn?
○○ How many points did the PLAYER B earn?
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5. Suppose your role is PLAYER A. Which of the following statements 
is true?
○○ You will be negotiating with the same person in the role of 
PLAYER B in all rounds
○○ You will be randomly assigned to negotiate with one of the per-
sons with the role of PLAYER B in each round
6. Suppose your role is PLAYER B. Which of the following statements 
is true?
○○ You will be negotiating with the same person in the role of 
PLAYER A in all rounds
○○ You will be randomly assigned to negotiate with one of the per-
sons with the role of PLAYER A in each round
Please wait for us to check your answers.
Instructions CORRELATED and 
UNCORRELATED treatment conditions
Experiment instructions
Introduction. You will now participate in an experiment on economic deci-
sion making. The experiment will last approximately 1.5 hours.
In the experiment, you will collect points. At the end of the experiment you 
will be paid for all the points you have earned. For your participation, you will 
receive €3. In addition, you can earn points during the experiment. How much 
you will earn crucially depends on the points you earn by your decisions in the 
experiment. No other experiment participant will learn how much you earned
The exchange rateis : ,100 6 1 6points Euro point Euro-cent= =
You are not allowed to talk to other participants or use any electronic 
communication device, such as your cell phone, from now on. Disobeying 
this rule will result in your exclusion from the experiment and loss of any 
points you have earned.
Description box
In this experiment, you will participate in 15 rounds of interaction.
At the start of the experiment, you will be assigned a role. You can become 
either a PLAYER A or a PLAYER B. You will stay in the same role for all 15 
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rounds of the interaction and will interact with a different participant in the 
other role in each round.
In each round, you and the other participant will have to agree on how to 
divide a certain number of points. This number will be 24 points plus an 
additional number of points. The number of additional points can be different 
in each round and can be any even number between −12 and + 12. That means 
that the additional points can be any of the following numbers: {−12, −10, −8, 
−6, −4, −2, 0, 2, 4, 6, 8, 10, 12}. Only PLAYER A will learn the number of 
additional points in each round.
IMPORTANT: Note that the additional points can be a negative number, 
so that the total number of points at the start of each round can be as low as 
24 − 12 = 12 points; but also as high as 24 + 12 = 36 points!
At the start of each round, PLAYER A learns the number of additional points. 
After this, PLAYER B can propose any number between 0 and 36 as the 
PROPOSAL. The PROPOSAL is the number of points that PLAYER B pro-
poses to earn at the end of the round, so that PLAYER A will earn the rest of 
the points. After PLAYER B’s initial PROPOSAL, PLAYER A and PLAYER 
B will have 1 minute to reach an agreement on the PROPOSAL.
During this period of 1 minute, both PLAYER A and PLAYER B can propose 
any number between 0 and 36 as the PROPOSAL, and change the PRO-
POSAL at any time within the 1 minute. PLAYER A and PLAYER B both 
can at any moment ACCEPT the most recent PROPOSAL made by the other 
person. Thus an agreement is reached if
either PLAYER A accepts some PROPOSAL made by PLAYER B
or PLAYER B accepts some PROPOSAL made by PLAYER A.
As soon as a PROPOSAL is ACCEPTED, the round of interaction is finished 
and the earnings for that round will be as follows:
PLAYER A’s earnings = [24 points plus the additional points] minus the 
number of points agreed on for the PROPOSAL
PLAYER B’s earnings = the number of points agreed on for the PROPOSAL
IMPORTANT: If no PROPOSAL is ACCEPTED within the 1 minute, 
PLAYER A and PLAYER B will both earn 0 points in that round.
After all participants in the room have finished their interactions you will learn 
how many points you have earned in this round. Then, the next round will start.
Additional information on the computer screen
During each round, some information will appear on your screen. The same 
type of information will be available to you in all rounds.
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Information type 1. For our research, we conduct experimental sessions on 
several days. In each session, the participants engage in exactly the same 
interactions as explained in the Description box and as you will engage in 
now. Points are worth exactly as much in all other sessions as in the current 
session, and the participants in the other sessions are also students.
In the UPPER LEFT part of the screen, we will display information 
about one other negotiation by some other PLAYER A and PLAYER B pair 
in one of these other sessions.
You will learn the PROPOSAL agreed to in that negotiation (=the number 
of points earned by the PLAYER B in that negotiation). In case there was no 
agreement in that negotiation, you will learn that there was NO AGREEMENT.
In each round, this information will be about a different negotiation of a 
different PLAYER A and PLAYER B pair.
This information will be made available to you in all rounds.
Important: The additional number of points in this other negotiation 
was either exactly the same as the number of additional points in your cur-
rent round or one of any of the possible number of additional points (any 
even number between −12 and +12). You will learn which one of these two 
cases apply by looking at the UPPER LEFT part of the screen.
Let us now explain what the computer screens look like.
Screen 1 player A. You will only see this screen if your role is PLAYER 
A. At the top of this screen, you will learn about the additional number of points 
in this round. After you have learned the additional number of points, press OK to 
continue. The information presented in the top part of screen will also be available 
to you on the next screen.
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Screen 1 Player B. You will only see this screen if your role is PLAYER 
B. At the top of this screen, you will see some information about the number 
of points in this round. This information will also be available to you on the 
next screen. In the lower center part of this screen, you can make your initial 
OPENING PROPOSAL. Type in a number between 0 and 36 and press OK to 
send your OPENING PROPOSAL to the other person. After that, you will be 
taken to the next screen where you will have 1 minute to reach an agreement on 
the PROPOSAL with the other person.
Negotiation screens
In this screen, PLAYER A and PLAYER B will be able to make a 
PROPOSAL or accept the most recent PROPOSAL by the other person 
within the period of 1 minute. The screen is divided into different parts.
At the top of the screen, the same information as in SCREEN 1 about the 
number of points in the current round are shown.
In the LOWER LEFT part, you will be able to make a PROPOSAL. Type 
in any number between 0 and 36 and press OK. Your PROPOSAL will 
appear on the screen of the person you are matched to.
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Screen 2 Player A (Negotiation Screen). 
The LOWER RIGHT part is divided into two sections. To the left, you 
can observe the PROPOSALS made by the other person. Very important!: 
If you would like to accept the most recent PROPOSAL of the other person, 
first select the PROPOSAL by clicking on it, then click on I ACCEPT 
THIS PROPOSAL. To the right, you can see the PROPOSALS you have 
send to the other person.
As soon as you or the other person accepts a PROPOSAL, this 
PROPOSAL will determine your earnings in this round. If no PROPOSAL 
was accepted within 1 minute, you will earn 0 points.
In the UPPER LEFT part, you find additional information about one 
other PROPOSAL agreed upon in a previous round by one of the other 
PLAYER A and PLAYER B pairs. That means, you will thus learn the num-
ber of points earned by one PLAYER B in a previous round. In case there 
was no agreement between that pair, you will learn that there was NO 
AGREEMENT.
Lehr et al. 41
Screen 2 Player B (Negotiation Screen) 
Important: In each round any pair of a PLAYER A and a PLAYER B 
will see the same screen. However, only PLAYER A will know the addi-
tional number of points in that round.
The experiment now starts with a short test to make sure that everybody 
understands how points are earned. After all experiment participants 
answered all questions correctly, we will first start two trial rounds of inter-
action to insure that everybody understands how the screens work. These 
two rounds will not add to your earnings. After the trial rounds, the 15 
rounds of interaction that determine your earnings will start.
Please start by answering the following questions.
Test questions
Please write down your answers!
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1. Suppose that the additional number of points is −6 and the 
PROPOSAL that PLAYER A and PLAYER B agree on is 10.
○○ How many points did PLAYER A earn?
○○  How many points did PLAYER B earn?
2. Suppose that the additional number of points +6 and the PROPOSAL 
that PLAYER A and PLAYER B agree on is 10.
○○ How many points did the PLAYER A earn?
○○ How many points did the PLAYER B earn?
3. Suppose that the additional number of points is 0, and the 
PROPOSAL that PLAYER A and PLAYER B agree on is 30.
○○ How many points did the PLAYER A earn?
○○ How many points did the PLAYER B earn?
4. Suppose that the both PLAYER A and PLAYER B did not accept 
any PROPOSAL within 1 minute.
○○ How many points did the PLAYER A earn?
○○ How many points did the PLAYER B earn?
5. Suppose you see a PROPOSAL agreed to by another PLAYER A 
and PLAYER B pair in the previous round. Will you be able to tell 
if the additional number of points in that negotiation was either (a) 
exactly the same as the additional number of points in your current 
negotiation or (b) if it was one of any even number between −12 and 
+12.
○○ No
○○ Yes, by looking at the LOWER LEFT part of the screen
○○ Yes, by looking at the UPPER LEFT part of the screen
○○ Yes, by looking at the UPPER RIGHT part of the screen
6. Suppose your role is PLAYER A. Which of the following statements 
is true?
○○ You will be negotiating with the same person in the role of 
PLAYER B in all rounds
○○ You will be randomly assigned to negotiate with one of the per-
sons with the role of PLAYER B in each round
7. Suppose your role is PLAYER B. Which of the following statements 
is true?
○○ You will be negotiating with the same person in the role of 
PLAYER A in all rounds
○○ You will be randomly assigned to negotiate with one of the per-
sons with the role of PLAYER A in each round
Please wait for us to check your answers.
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Instructions CORRELATED/REPUTATION and 
UNCORRELATED/REPUTATION treatment 
conditions
Experiment instructions
Introduction. You will now participate in an experiment on economic deci-
sion making. The experiment will last approximately 1.5 hours.
In the experiment, you will collect points. At the end of the experiment you 
will be paid for all the points you have earned. For your participation, you will 
receive €3. In addition, you can earn points during the experiment. How much 
you will earn crucially depends on the points you earn by your decisions in the 
experiment. No other experiment participant will learn how much you earned
Theexchange rateis : ,100 6 1 6points Euro point Euro-cent= =
You are not allowed to talk to other participants or use any electronic 
communication device, such as your cell phone, from now on. Disobeying 
this rule will result in your exclusion from the experiment and loss of any 
points you have earned.
Description box
In this experiment, you will participate in 15 rounds of interaction.
At the start of the experiment, you will be assigned a role. You can become 
either a PLAYER A or a PLAYER B. You will stay in the same role for all 15 
rounds of the interaction and will interact with a different participant in the 
other role in each round.
In each round, you and the other participant will have to agree on how to 
divide a certain number of points. This number will be 24 points plus an 
additional number of points. The number of additional points can be different 
in each round and can be any even number between −12 and + 12. That means 
that the additional points can be any of the following numbers: {−12, −10, −8, 
−6, −4, −2, 0, 2, 4, 6, 8, 10, 12}. Only PLAYER A will learn the number of 
additional points in each round.
IMPORTANT: Note that the additional points can be a negative number, 
so that the total number of points at the start of each round can be as low as 
24 − 12 = 12 points; but also as high as 24 + 12 = 36 points!
At the start of each round, PLAYER A learns the number of additional 
points. After this, PLAYER B can propose any number between 0 and 36 as  
the PROPOSAL. The PROPOSAL is the number of points that PLAYER B 
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proposes to earn at the end of the round, so that PLAYER A will earn the 
rest of the points. After PLAYER B’s initial PROPOSAL, PLAYER A and 
PLAYER B will have 1 minute to reach an agreement on the PROPOSAL.
During this period of 1 minute, both PLAYER A and PLAYER B can propose 
any number between 0 and 36 as the PROPOSAL, and change the PRO-
POSAL at any time within the 1 minute. PLAYER A and PLAYER B both 
can at any moment ACCEPT the most recent PROPOSAL made by the other 
person. Thus an agreement is reached if
either PLAYER A accepts some PROPOSAL made by PLAYER B
or PLAYER B accepts some PROPOSAL made by PLAYER A.
As soon as a PROPOSAL is ACCEPTED, the round of interaction is finished 
and the earnings for that round will be as follows:
PLAYER A’s earnings = [24 points plus the additional points] minus the 
number of points agreed on for the PROPOSAL
PLAYER B’s earnings = the number of points agreed on for the PROPOSAL
IMPORTANT: If no PROPOSAL is ACCEPTED within the 1 minute, 
PLAYER A and PLAYER B will both earn 0 points in that round.
After all participants in the room have finished their interactions you will learn 
how many points you have earned in this round. Then the next round will start.
Additional information on the computer screen:
During each round, some information will appear on your screen. The same 
type of information will be available to you in all rounds, except for the first 
round.
Information type 1. For our research, we conduct experimental sessions on 
several days. In each session, the participants engage in exactly the same 
interactions as explained in the Description box and as you will engage in 
now. Points are worth exactly as much in all other sessions as in the current 
session, and the participants in the other sessions are also students.
In the UPPER LEFT part of the screen, we will display information 
about one other negotiation by some other PLAYER A and PLAYER B pair 
in one of these other sessions.
You will learn the PROPOSAL agreed to in that negotiation (=the num-
ber of points earned by the PLAYER B in that negotiation). In case there 
was no agreement in that negotiation, you will learn that there was NO 
AGREEMENT.
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In each round, this information will be about a different negotiation of a 
different PLAYER A and PLAYER B pair.
This information will be made available to you in all rounds.
Important: The additional number of points in this other negotia-
tion was either exactly the same as the number of additional points in 
your current round or one of any of the possible number of additional 
points (any even number between −12 and +12). You will learn which 
one of these two cases apply by looking at the UPPER LEFT part of the 
screen.
Information type 2. In the UPPER RIGHT part of the computer screen, we 
will display information about the PERCENTAGE of the total number 
of points that the current PLAYER A earned in the previous period. This 
PERCENTAGE is the number of points earned by the current PLAYER 
A in the last round (24 points plus the additional points minus the num-
ber of points agreed on for the PROPOSAL) divided by (24 points plus 
the additional points)
For example, if in PLAYER A’s previous round the additional number of 
points was −2 and the PROPOSAL agreed to in that round was 8; then the 
current PLAYER A earned 24 − 2 − 8 = 14 points. The total number of points 
at the start of that round was of 24 − 2 = 22 points, making current PLAYER 
A’s earned PERCENTAGE 14/22 = 64%. In that case, 64% will appear in 
the UPPER RIGHT part of the screen.
Therefore, if your role is PLAYER A, the PERCENTAGE of the total 
points you earned in any round will be known to the PLAYER B in your 
next round. If your role is PLAYER B, the PERCENTAGE of the total 
points that the current PLAYER A earned in the previous round will be 
known to you.
Because this information is about previous rounds, it will appear for the 
first time in ROUND 2 and then be made available to you for each of the 
following rounds.
Let us now explain what the computer screens look like.
Negotiation screens
In this screen, PLAYER A and PLAYER B will be able to make a 
PROPOSAL or accept the most recent PROPOSAL by the other person 
within the period of 1 minute. The screen is divided into different parts.
At the top of the screen, the same information as in SCREEN 1 about the 
number of points in the current round are shown.
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Screen 1 Player A You will only see this screen if your role is PLAYER 
A. At the top of this screen, you will learn about the additional number of points 
in this round. After you have learned the additional number of points, press OK 
to continue. The information presented in the top part of screen will also be 
available to you on the next screen.
Screen 1 Player B. You will only see this screen if your role is PLAYER B. At 
the top of this screen, you will see some information about the number of points in this 
round. This information will also be available to you on the next screen. In the lower 
center part of this screen, you can make your initial OPENING PROPOSAL. Type in 
a number between 0 and 36 and press OK to send your OPENING PROPOSAL to 
the other person. After that, you will be taken to the next screen where you will have 
1 minute to reach an agreement on the PROPOSAL with the other person.
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Screen 2 Player A (Negotiation Screen). 
Screen 2 Player B (Negotiation Screen). 
In the LOWER LEFT part, you will be able to make a PROPOSAL. Type 
in any number between 0 and 36 and press OK. Your PROPOSAL will 
appear on the screen of the person you are matched to.
48 Rationality and Society 30(1)
The LOWER RIGHT part is divided into two sections. To the left, you 
can observe the PROPOSALS made by the other person. Very important!: 
If you would like to accept the most recent PROPOSAL of the other person, 
first select the PROPOSAL by clicking on it, then click on I ACCEPT 
THIS PROPOSAL. To the right, you can see the PROPOSALS you have 
send to the other person.
As soon as you or the other person accepts a PROPOSAL, this 
PROPOSAL will determine your earnings in this round. If no PROPOSAL 
was accepted within 1 minute, you will earn 0 points.
In the UPPER LEFT part, you find additional information about one 
other PROPOSAL agreed upon in a previous session by one of the other 
PLAYER A and PLAYER B pairs. That means, you will thus learn the num-
ber of points earned by one PLAYER B in one round in one of the previous 
sessions. In case there was no agreement between that pair, you will learn 
that there was NO AGREEMENT.
In the UPPER RIGHT part, we will display information about the 
PERCENTAGE of the total points that PLAYER A earned in the previous 
round.
Because this information is about previous rounds, it will appear for the 
first time in ROUND 2 and then be made available to you for each of the 
following rounds.
Important: In each round any pair of a PLAYER A and a PLAYER B 
will see the same negotiation screen. However, only PLAYER A will know 
the additional number of points in that round.
The experiment now starts with a short test to make sure that every-
body understands how points are earned. After all experiment partici-
pants answered all questions correctly, we will first start two trial 
rounds of interaction to insure that everybody understands how the 
screens work. These two rounds will not add to your earnings. After the 
trial rounds, the 15 rounds of interaction that determine your earnings 
will start.
Please start by answering the following questions.
Test questions
Please write down your answers!
1. Suppose that the additional number of points is −6 and the 
PROPOSAL that PLAYER A and PLAYER B agree on is 10.
○○ How many points did PLAYER A earn?
○○ How many points did PLAYER B earn?
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(2) Suppose that the additional number of points +6 and the PROPOSAL 
that PLAYER A and PLAYER B agree on is 10.
○○ How many points did the PLAYER A earn?
○○ How many points did the PLAYER B earn?
(3) Suppose that the additional number of points is 0; and the 
PROPOSAL that PLAYER A and PLAYER B agree on is 30.
○○ How many points did the PLAYER A earn?
○○ How many points did the PLAYER B earn?
(4) Suppose that the both PLAYER A and PLAYER B did not accept 
any PROPOSAL within 1 minute.
○○ How many points did the PLAYER A earn?
○○ How many points did the PLAYER B earn?
(5) What information is shown to you in the UPPER LEFT part of the 
screen?
○○ The number of points one PLAYER A earned in a previous 
round
○○ The PERCENTAGE of the total points earned by PLAYER A in 
all previous rounds
○○ A PROPOSAL agreed on by another PLAYER A and PLAYER 
B pair in a previous session
○○ The PERCENTAGE of the total points earned by PLAYER A in 
the previous round
(6) What information is shown to you in the UPPER RIGHT part of the 
screen?
○○ The number of points one PLAYER A earned in a previous 
round
○○ The PERCENTAGE of the total points earned by PLAYER A in 
all previous rounds
○○ A PROPOSAL agreed on by another PLAYER A and PLAYER 
B pair in a previous session
○○ The PERCENTAGE of the total points earned by PLAYER A in 
the previous round
(7) Suppose you see a PROPOSAL agreed to by another PLAYER A and 
PLAYER B pair in a previous session. Will you be able to tell if the 
additional number of points in that negotiation was either (a) exactly 
the same as the additional number of points in your current negotia-
tion or (b) if it was one of any even number between −12 and +12.
○○ No
○○ Yes, by looking at the LOWER LEFT part of the screen
○○ Yes, by looking at the UPPER LEFT part of the screen
○○ Yes, by looking at the UPPER RIGHT part of the screen
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8. Suppose your role is PLAYER A. Which of the following statements 
is true?
○○ You will be negotiating with the same person in the role of 
PLAYER B in all rounds
○○ You will be randomly assigned to negotiate with one of the per-
sons with the role of PLAYER B in each round
9. Suppose your role is PLAYER B. Which of the following statements 
is true?
○○ You will be negotiating with the same person in the role of 
PLAYER A in all rounds
○○ You will be randomly assigned to negotiate with one of the per-
sons with the role of PLAYER A in each round
Please wait for us to check your answers.
Appendix 2
Table 4. Linear regression estimates of the effects on the divergence between 
union and firm proposals during bargaining, crossed subject specific random 
effects and negotiation specific random effects (14 Periods), MLE.
Fixed effects Model
1 2
b b
Intercept 18.517*** (1.379) 18.268*** (1.383)
Period −0.140*** (0.026) 0.139*** (0.026)
Variable surplus −0.142*** (0.013) −0.142*** (0.013)
Time (seconds) −0.328*** (0.002) −0.317*** (0.005)
Treatment (dummy)
 CONTROL Reference Reference
 UNCORRELATED 4.050* (1.847) 5.103** (1.852)
 CORRELATED 0.159 (1.814) 0.289 (1.820)
 UNCORRELATED/REPUTATION −0.345 (1.169) −0.174 (1.690)
 CORRELATED/REPUTATION 0.588 (1.671) 0.613 (1.676)
Interaction
 Time × UNCORRELATED −0.044*** (0.007)
 Time × CORRELATED −0.006 (0.007)
  Time × UNCORRELATED/
REPUTATION
−0.008 (0.006)
  Time × CORRELATED/
REPUTATION
−0.002 (0.006)
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Fixed effects Model
1 2
b b
Random effects
 σu
2  (union player) 15.502 (2.703) 15.473 (2.698)
 σv
2  (firm player)
2.287 (0.561) 2.272 (0.558)
 σw
2  (negotiation)
10.109 (0.538) 10.104 (0.537)
 σr
2  (residual)
9.990 (0.141) 9.268 (0.140)
Model summary
 Wald χ2 (df) 31,520.51 (7)*** 31,791.42 (11)***
 Log likelihood −29,813.066 −29,779.867
 N observations 11,066
 N negotiations 1023
MLE: maximum likelihood estimation.
Standard errors in parentheses.
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001; two-tailed, only reported for fixed effects.
Table 4. (Continued)
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